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 NHP Early Years |
Democratic Primary |
| 1952 - Beauty Contest |
Segment 4 |
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| NHP Early Years |
Democratic Primary |
| 1952 - Beauty Contest |
Segment 4 |
| NHP Early Years Return to index of stories... |
The New Hampshire Primary: the Early Years. CR Welcome back. New Hampshire held its first presidential primary in 1916, 100 years ago, but few people paid any attention to the results. After all, New Hampshire was a very small state with little political influence, and the meager number of delegates coming from the Granite State would have little, if any impact on a nomination. CR And across the nation, despite the fact that some states had begun to use primaries to choose delegates to party conventions, this transformation of the presidential nomination process turned out to be far from complete. After 1920, only about one-third of the states employed primaries as their mode of selection. CR As a result, the national party convention still held the balance of power when it came to the final selection of a presidential nominee. Most delegates arriving at the convention were, in theory, not bound to vote for any nominee. As a result, state and local party organizations maintained their power throughout much of the twentieth century. CR In 1920, as we mentioned earlier, Minnesota dropped its primary and returned to choosing delegates by a party caucus. And Indiana moved its primary into May, leaving New Hampshire with the first primary contest in the nation. So of course, New Hampshire now was the subject of intense campaigning by candidates as well as swarms of media covering the Town Meeting day event, right? CR Well actually, no. There is no record that the there was any notice that New Hampshire had the first primary and there is only passing reference to the delegates who were awarded that year. CR Throughout the 1920s, 30s and 40s, New Hampshire continued to hold the first in the nation primary and for all of these cycles, no one paid any attention. This is an important point when considering the importance that the primary later gained and the envy that many other states developed. CR "Why should New Hampshire get to have the first primary?" is a question that political leaders from other states have asked in recent decades. And it is true that New Hampshire now zealously defends the position of the Primary, but truth be told, we didn't care much that we were first in the early years, and neither did anyone else. New Hampshire became the first primary by happenstance and weather. It happened that no other state wanted to hold its primary early, and ours was early to coincide with town meeting day. CR Many states, including Minnesota, dropped primaries after the surge in the Progressive era, largely because they did not deliver on the promise of democratizing the nomination process. Turnout was typically quite low, to the point that many states didn't see any advantage over a caucus. And since the parties paid for caucuses, why not just drop the primary? Many states did exactly that, but New Hampshire did not. CR Then, in 1952, the New Hampshire Primary got a major face lift. Three years earlier, the Speaker of New Hampshire's House of Representatives, Richard Upton, noted that a chief criticism of the primary was that voters did not choose candidates. They actually just voted for delegates to the convention. CR As a result, Upton said, the primary was "too indirect to be meaningful and … frustrating to the average voter, who had only limited opportunity to make known his preference for the office of president." He decided the primary would be "more interesting and meaningful" to voters, resulting in greater turnout, if the names of the presidential candidates themselves were on the ballot. CR At his instigation, the legislature passed a law specifying that - in addition to the ballots for delegates - there would also be ballots for the presidential candidates, with their names listed separately. CR The ballot with presidential candidates was widely referred to as the "beauty contest," because the vote for the presidential candidates had no official impact. Delegates were still selected by a separate vote, so it was theoretically possible that a presidential candidate could win the beauty contest and still not win the most delegates. That's because some prominent delegates, well-known state leaders in their own right, might well attract more votes than other delegates supporting the candidate preferred by the voters. CR Still, the beauty contest became the event to watch. The results gave the media the first hint of what real voters actually thought about potential candidates for president - and thus the results received wide coverage. Political leaders and pundits generally treated the results with great seriousness, giving New Hampshire much more influence than its small size would otherwise indicate. CR As a result, starting in 1952, the New Hampshire Primary - because of its first-in-the-nation status - began to exert an influence on the presidential selection process far greater than the size of its small delegation to the party conventions. CR We'll talk more about that 1952 election next time. CR |
| 1952 - Beauty Contest Return to index of stories... |
1952 - New Hampshire's First Beauty Contest Makes History CR 1952 marked the first "modern" New Hampshire presidential primary, in which voters cast ballots for the candidates of their choice. But in many ways, the Granite State's first presidential beauty contest that New Hampshire ever hosted bore little resemblance to the media-saturated event we know today. CR For example, imagine a New Hampshire primary in which the winner refused to campaign - and in which his major challenger campaigned in the state and lost - in part, it appears, because of his personal campaign appearances. CR That was the story of the 1952 New Hampshire Republican primary, the event that launched the political career of Dwight D. Eisenhower. CR Republican Primary CR The two major GOP candidates that year were Senator Robert Taft from Ohio, known as Mr. Republican, and General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was NATO Commander at the time his name was on the ballot. CR Many political leaders from both major parties had approached Eisenhower over the years, requesting that he run for president, but he was steadfast in his refusal to consider it. By 1951, Republicans were desperate for someone to rescue them from a 20-year presidential drought. CR Taft, who represented the conservative wing of the Republican Party was the presumptive front-runner, but he had already lost the nomination twice before, to Wendell Willkie in 1940 and to Thomas Dewey in 1948. CR Many Republican leaders, especially from the Eastern "Establishment" wing of the party, believed that the Ohio senator, who was still staunchly isolationist, couldn't win in the post-War period that demanded a more assertive U.S. foreign policy. Eisenhower the war hero, on the other hand, would be just the ticket. CR The problem was that Eisenhower did not want to run. Eventually he seemed willing to be drafted, but he did not want to campaign. He apparently had the notion that it would be ideal if both parties would nominate him and he could, as did General Washington, be elected essentially by acclamation. CR After much sleuthing, party leaders were able to show that at least Eisenhower had never affiliated himself with the Democrats. He apparently had never registered to vote and had never engaged in partisan statements that would indicate his party preference. With that reassurance, they now wanted to show his electoral appeal by having his name appear on the New Hampshire Primary ballot. But if they put his name on the ballot, would he repudiate it? CR In early January 1952, Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, the man elected to be Eisenhower's campaign manager by members of the Draft Eisenhower movement, took the calculated risk of forcing the general to make a decision. Lodge announced that Eisenhower had personally assured him and others that the general was a Republican and would accept the nomination for president. This infuriated Eisenhower, who almost repudiated the draft effort. But Eisenhower did not officially object to the statement and this kept the draft movement on track. CR Still, it wasn't at all clear that Eisenhower would have any serious competition, which could diminish the significance of a victory. Taft had avoided entering any primary during his two previous attempts at gaining the nomination, and apparently for good reason. He was widely viewed as a lousy campaigner, with a harsh speaking voice and an inability to mingle easily with strangers. CR On the other hand, most of the campaigning would be done by surrogates, Taft's supporters in the state, just as all of the campaigning for Eisenhower would have to be done by his supporters. Taft mulled over whether to get into the primary, on the one hand knowing his weakness as a campaigner, but on the other wanting to deliver a death blow to the burgeoning Draft Eisenhower movement. If Ike were defeated in his first electoral effort, it could completely derail his candidacy. CR Finally, Taft agreed to compete. His campaign manager called Taft's entrance into the New Hampshire Primary "absolute fearlessness…Bob Taft has never run from a fight, and, even though he has the great disadvantage of running in a state that has been carefully selected as the first and most secure arena for General Eisenhower, he shows no hesitancy." Taft's entry into the primary was great news, at least to New Hampshire, for Taft's entrance gave legitimacy to its maiden beauty contest. Here were the two major GOP candidates in a head-to-head fight for the support of actual voters. CR And the news was also good for the Draft Eisenhower movement, which initially expected a rather easy triumph. As the campaign progressed, however, an Eisenhower victory appeared less certain. Taft committed himself to a personal three-day campaign effort in the state, during which he received extensive press coverage. CR The general's surrogates became worried, especially since earlier they had claimed the state was "in the bag," a bold statement that politicos today tend to avoid at all cost. As politicians would eventually learn, the interpretations of primary results are as much about press expectations of the outcome, as they are about the actual number of votes cast. CR Suddenly, Eisenhower's supporters were downplaying expectations, suggesting that if Ike were to win after the personal appearances by Taft, it would be a "political miracle." Taft forces, of course, had already downplayed expectations when Taft entered the race, by claiming the state was specially chosen because it was a "secure arena" for the general. What the Taft campaign wanted was a "moral victory," winning at least some of the 14 delegates and finishing a close second in the beauty contest. CR Taft's hopes, however, were dashed. It was Eisenhower, the war hero who was still defending his country on active duty in Europe and had never set foot on New Hampshire soil during the campaign, who won a double-digit victory in the beauty contest, 50% to 39%. Ike also won all 14 delegates in a separate vote on the ballot. CR Then New Hampshire governor Sherman Adams was critical to the Eisenhower campaign. He was rewarded for his service by being named Chief of Staff in the Eisenhower White House. Adams's move to the Oval Office was surely noted by aspiring politicos in the Granite State, who now recognized that joining a successful primary campaign in New Hampshire could be their ticket to a prime post in Washington, D. C. CR |
| Democratic Primary Return to index of stories... |
1952 Democratic Primary CR Welcome back. Last time, we discussed how the New Hampshire primary launched the presidential campaign of Dwight Eisenhower in 1952 - and how the publicity surrounding the general's bid for the presidency lifted the previously obscure primary into the national limelight. CR But the Democratic Party also had a competitive primary in 1952. The funny thing was that the Democratic candidate who won, Tennessee Senator Estes Kefauver, really didn't want to win. Indeed, he felt that in the long run his primary victory hurt his chances to be president rather than helped them. CR Although there is evidence that President Truman did not intend to run for re-election in 1952, he had not yet let the public know when Kefauver announced his candidacy for the Democratic Party's nomination. Kefauver already was something of a national figure, thanks to his leadership of an investigation of organized crime, which was shown on national television. CR Prior to his announcement, Kefauver had consulted with Truman, indicating that he would not run if the president were to seek re-election. But Truman said he had not made up his mind. Kefauver told the president that he would therefore seek the nomination, but hoped it would not be interpreted as an "affront." CR The senator subsequently filed to run in the New Hampshire Primary, proposing a full slate of delegates and, separately, entering his name into the primary's first "beauty contest." CR In the meantime, Truman was searching for a candidate other than Kefauver, offering his support to Supreme Court Chief Justice Fred Vinson, who declined, and then to Illinois Governor Adlai Stevenson, who also declined. CR When Kefauver made his announcement, Truman had not yet found an acceptable candidate who was willing to run. And when asked about Kefauver's challenge during his weekly press conference at the end of January, the president was dismissive of the effort. If he decided to run for re-election, Truman said, the party would nominate him regardless of whether he had competed in any primaries. CR While he endorsed legislation that would establish a single national primary, he said the present system of state primaries was just "eyewash" as would be evident when the national convention was held. He was right, of course, as Kefauver would in fact discover that summer at the national convention, when he arrived with more delegates won in primaries than any other candidate, but still could not get the party's nomination. CR Truman's comment and apparent intention to remove his name from the contest created a firestorm of protest from people within the state, so much so that the president relented - sending a letter to New Hampshire Secretary of State Enoch D. Fuller, saying he had been persuaded by many Democrats nationally and in the state that his name should be left on the ballot. CR Recognizing that campaigning head-to-head against the president, the leader of his own party, was somewhat of a gamble, Kefauver offered to withdraw from the New Hampshire Primary if Truman would also. But the president's supporters, unhappy with Kefauver's challenge and eager to trounce the senator early on, rejected the compromise. CR Virtually everyone expected Truman to win easily. Even Kefauver expected to lose, but hoped to make the contest close in order to show that he was a viable candidate. Kefauver made two trips to the state in the final month of the campaign and was an especially effective campaigner. CR Truman, of course, didn't campaign personally, and his surrogates seemed unable to mount an effective effort, apparently victims of over-confidence. Only as voting day approached did some of the state leaders recognize that Kefauver might make a more impressive showing than originally anticipated. CR Still, the pundits and politicians all expected a Truman victory. And just as Truman's victory over Dewey in 1948 shocked the nation, Truman's solid defeat in the New Hampshire Primary surprised everyone. He lost the beauty contest 55% to 44%, and he failed to win even one delegate. CR After the loss in New Hampshire, Truman decided not to seek reelection in 1952. This would be the first, but not the last, time that New Hampshire would defeat a sitting president. The New Hampshire Primary had now, for the first time since its institution thirty-six years earlier, become a potent force in the nomination process. CR New Hampshire, however, was not yet potent enough to change Kefauver's fate. Despite his success in the primaries in the Granite State and elsewhere, Democratic Party bosses eventually chose Adlai Stevenson to be their party's nominee. CR |
| Segment 4 Return to index of stories... |
Welcome back. New Hampshire's 1960 presidential primary was the site of overwhelming victories: Richard Nixon carried 89% of the Republican vote, while backyard candidate John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts scored 85% of the Democratic vote. CR Their victories were not unexpected, but each achieved astounding numbers, generating enthusiasm among their respective rank-and-file voters that impressed pundits and politicians outside the state. And both campaigns experienced notable events that provide additional insight into the unique character of the New Hampshire Primary. CR Republican Primary As the sitting vice president, Nixon was the presumptive front-runner for the GOP nomination in 1960. CR New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller contemplated a challenge as part of the moderate wing of the party, and though he eventually did not declare his candidacy, the possibility of his doing so provided some behind-the-scenes melodrama for the Nixon campaign. CR The instigator of the drama was a Granite State politician, but not just any politico. It was New Hampshire's Governor Wesley Powell, essentially a creature of William Loeb's newspaper the Manchester Union Leader - at least that's how Loeb seemed to describe Powell, and the description is supported by objective evidence. Without Loeb's using his paper to actively campaign for Powell , the Manchester attorney would almost certainly not have been elected governor. CR Believing he could take advantage of the publicity associated with the New Hampshire Primary, Powell demanded to be the chairman of Nixon's state campaign, with full control over spending campaign money and other strategic decisions. Although the Nixon campaign wanted the support of the state's governor, these were unusual demands and, to the national campaign staff, unacceptable. The Nixon campaign refused. CR Then Powell threatened to join the Rockefeller campaign. That was a serious threat. Nixon's aides were highly concerned that Rockefeller would mount a formidable campaign effort in the state, based on his immense wealth and on his close ties to the state already. Should the state's governor be part of that effort, it could seriously undermine Nixon's clear march to the nomination. CR Given a deadline of only several hours in which to decide, the campaign staff caved and named the governor Chairman of the Nixon campaign in the state. This would not be the last time the Union Leader would influence the presidential primary - and it was far from the last time that a national presidential campaign would have to kowtow to New Hampshire political activists. CR Democratic Primary CR Despite the failure to get the Democratic vice presidential nomination in 1956, John F. Kennedy gained a great deal of national publicity and propelled himself into the front ranks of potential Democratic candidates for 1960. CR But he knew that his youth and Catholic religion would be major obstacles to overcome. He needed the primaries to demonstrate his vote-getting capability. CR In his northern neighbor New Hampshire, he had to get a good send-off if he were going to impress the party leaders across the country who controlled most of the delegates. The only other potential Democratic candidate who would run in a primary against Kennedy was Minnesota Senator Hubert Humphrey, but even he refused to challenge the Massachusetts senator in his back yard. The lack of competition put an even bigger premium on Kennedy's efforts to get a high vote total in New Hampshire. CR While a Kennedy win was clearly expected, the campaign staff went to work to maximize the vote total. CR The spade work that Kennedy had done in the years leading up to his presidential bid, appearing in the state several times and meeting with local leaders, provided a solid base of support. His staff's careful organization during the campaign built on that base, so that when the final votes came in, Kennedy not only won , but garnered about twice as many votes as did Kefauver four years earlier - though Kefauver's share that year was about the same as Kennedy's. CR This surprisingly high vote total gave ammunition to the Kennedy campaign to support its claim that the young senator could generate enthusiasm that no other Democratic candidate could match. CR Kennedy still had primaries ahead of him - against Humphrey in Wisconsin, seen as Humphrey's back yard, and then against Humphrey again in West Virginia, where Kennedy would try to demonstrate that his Catholic religion was not an insurmountable obstacle to becoming president. CR Remember, even as late as 1960, it was still party bosses who ultimately decided the presidential nominees of their parties. CR Candidates saw presidential primaries as important not because of the number of delegates they would earn by winning them. Winning primaries gave candidates the aura of electability in the eyes of the party leadership. That's why both John F. Kennedy and Hubert Humphrey saw primaries in Wisconsin and West Virginia as the truly key battles - JFK needed to win a primary in a state dominated by Protestants, in order to prove his Catholicism would not stop voters of different religions from supporting his candidacy. CR But the large turnout in New Hampshire was a crucial first step, acknowledged years later by his closest advisor at the time, Bernard Boutin, "If hadn't done well in New Hampshire, I think that the West Virginia victory and the victory in Wisconsin would have been impossible." CR |